Unspecified Full Disk Access Screw Tightening
Apple (Hacker News, MacRumors, Lobsters, TidBITS Talk):
Full Disk Access largely sidesteps these controls in order to allow backup apps to function properly on the Mac. Some developers are using Full Disk Access in ways that could put users at risk, exposing everything on their systems—including files, mail, messages, and even browsing history—without users’ full knowledge and understanding.
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Going forward, we will introduce additional controls to ensure that users who genuinely wish to grant an app this extraordinary level of access can only do so with very explicit user action. Addressing this is critical. As AI agents become increasingly capable and autonomous, the risks associated with this level of access will grow substantially.
It was pretty obvious something like this would happen after the Muse accessing Messages news.
What we have is just one noisy, confused journalist, Jason Aten. He granted FDA to Muse but refuses to admit it, to the public or even to himself.
I see several issues with the current Full Disk Access system:
Backup apps need FDA, but so do many other types of apps. Often, they don’t need full disk access but rather they need to work around a missing or broken API. All of my apps except ToothFairy use FDA, not because I want to or because it’s easier to code, but because without it the user experience would be much worse or key features wouldn’t work at all.
There is no API for apps to see whether they have FDA or to request it from the user. It’s not like, say, accessing the user’s Contacts where macOS pops up a standard dialog and the app supplies a “reason” string to specify why it wants access. Instead, each app presents its own set of instructions for how to enable it deep in System Settings. It requires the confusing maneuver of first adding the app to the list; it doesn’t automatically show up with a slider switch next to it, like with other privacy settings. This adds an obstacle for users to get up and running with an app but doesn’t really provide additional security, just obscurity.
FDA is not granular. There’s no way for apps to request only the permissions they actually need. For example, SpamSieve wants to be able to access the user’s mail, but it doesn’t need or want to see their iMessages or browser history. This is bad for users because they may be exposing more information than they want to and bad for developers because some users will think your app isn’t worth the risks.
There is no way for the user to see what the app actually did. If it tells me that it wants FDA to access my mail but actually it mucked around with my Time Machine backup, how would I know?
Apple’s wording in System Settings is not very clear. I don’t think most users really understand what FDA is doing.
The previous items combine to create opportunities for malfeasance. It’s normalized that many apps that seem like they wouldn’t need full disk access do need FDA, so this makes it easier for apps to trick the user into granting it under false pretenses. Apple requires that apps coach the user through the process, so it’s normal that users mostly see text from the app (which might not be trustworthy) rather than standard text from Apple, as with other permissions prompts.
But the problem in the Muse case was not malfeasance. Rather, it seems that Muse asked Aten to enable FDA, but he doesn’t remember doing so or didn’t understand what he was doing. It sounds like Apple wants to make this consent more clear, which is good, but other issues would remain. As with the recent keychain story, this feels like a bandaid rather than a thoughtful solution to the real problem. The issues with FDA were clear when it was introduced 8 years ago, and many Radars were filed, but it’s been virtually unchanged since.
Apple seems to think that by making a scarier warning they can convince more users not to grant FDA—or at least perhaps deflect blame from Apple to the user if they later regret it. Maybe that solves Apple’s problem, but it doesn’t really solve the user’s problem. The user is installing Muse because it’s more capable than Siri. They probably do want it to access some protected data, e.g. so it can find information in their mail or messages. So they actually do need to give it FDA. Aside from deterrence, Apple is not actually protecting the user. And the deterrence is kind of sketchy. Rather than providing a safe way for users to choose what to share with a competing product, Apple is saying the only option is to share everything, and then discouraging that. Meanwhile, there’s no switch to turn off Apple Intelligence. It’s like they expect you to stay on eWorld and not download Netscape. I actually really liked eWorld, and the broad Internet wasn’t totally safe (though neither was eWorld), but that doesn’t seem like much of a strategy.
Below I’ve embedded […] a screen recording of a macOS Virtual Machine showing the first run experience of the Meta Muse app.
[…]
It’s important to note that macOS has no API for an app to request or acquire Full Disk Access. The only way for an app to receive Full Disk Access is via the Full Disk Access pane of System Settings, as shown in the video. Thus, the only thing an app can do is open the System Settings pane for the user, as also shown in the video. Once the user is in System Settings, it’s up to the user to manually grant Full Disk Access.
Without Full Disk Access, Muse cannot access the user’s Messages database. If it could, that would be a macOS zero day vulnerability.
[…]
Aten oddly writes as if the “if you give it Full Disk Access” earlier in the article were counterfactual, merely hypothetical, still insisting that he did not give Full Disk Access to Muse.
I really worry about just how much Apple is going to lock Full Disk Access down. I use it with several apps that couldn’t function properly without it, and would be severely hampered if I needed to authorize it manually every time they do something.
However, what Apple absolutely must not do is to make the mistake it made with macOS Sequoia over screen recording. Sure, this is also incredibly dangerous and very strong warnings are appropriate, but what Apple did then was to force us all to confirm these permissions on a weekly basis, as well as after every restart.
Well, this is certainly ominous news for backup programs.
Like it’s not hard enough to turn this stuff on…
Is Apple suggesting this capability could be limited in the future to backup applications alone? I do not like that.
[…]
Because of the lack of information available at present, I do not want to get too far ahead of myself, but I am concerned that it could be a significant curtailing of application permissions. It has the potential for further self-preferencing, as Apple will surely exempt Siri from the kinds of permissions requests it requires of third-party apps, even as it is updated with additional capabilities.
[…]
Call me a naïve little baby if you want, but I do not think preserving Siri’s dominance on Apple’s devices is the company’s reason for locking down Full Disk Access. But Apple’s existing restrictions are part of the reason Siri was awful for a decade. If it had the opportunity to compete with third-party replacements, I doubt it would have languished in a miserable state for as long as it did.
[Only] a handful of apps to which I’ve granted Full Disk Access are backup apps. Others include the Finder replacement Bloom, launchers like Alfred, the wonderful selection utility PopClip, Apple’s own Pixelmator Pro, Setapp, TestFlight, Supercharge, Madden NFL 27 Arcade Edition, Hazel, and many others. It’s a diverse selection of apps covering everything from Apple’s own apps to Mac utilities that are longtime favorites of MacStories readers, and even one Apple Arcade game.
[…]
On the one hand, it seems to suggest that users will simply have to jump through additional explicit hoops to grant Full Disk Access to their agents and other apps. On the other hand, claiming that Full Disk Access was designed solely for backup apps raises red flags that could signal that the company intends to restrict the kinds of apps that can use Full Disk Access. I sure hope not.
But there are plenty of legit uses for Full Disk Access. Just looking at my MacBook Air this morning, I’ve given that permission to three apps: Terminal, BBEdit, and SuperDuper. All apps that I trust with that level of power because of their long history and because in order to do what they do best (or at all), they need that access. (Interestingly, on my Mac mini, that list also includes SpamSieve, KnockKnock, and Shortcuts—though not BBEdit, for whatever reason.)
[…]
I think there is a good argument for protecting Full Disk Access further, but there’s also only so much you can do to protect a user from themselves. Ultimately, this is a cat-and-mouse game, and while I don’t want my data purloined or misused, I also don’t want my computer locked down to the point that I can’t use it for all the things I want to do.
To say that I’m nervous about what Apple’s solution will entail is a massive understatement. There is one aspect in which the Mac is the perfect agent host: Apple has, for decades, invested in a combination of scriptability, automation, and accessibility APIs (these are very often the same thing) that makes it remarkably well-suited to computer use. Then there is the fact that macOS is a certified Unix system; this means that agents — which are perfectly suited to the command line — have access to the entire universe of tooling built for Unix systems. And, of course, Mac hardware is amazing.
The problem is that for my particular use case — a headless, always-on Mac Mini that I primarily access from other computers and my phone through the ChatGPT and Claude apps — macOS is incredibly hostile. The biggest issue is GUI-only permission prompts that are invisible to software running on said computer, including agents.
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This system is annoying but manageable on your primary Mac; it’s a disaster on a headless Mac running agents, for two reasons. First, agents write new programs all of the time, and in my case, those programs need access to devices on my network (SMB shares, for example, trigger a TCC warning). What I need is a permission layer for agents, not the programs they create; TCC is operating at the wrong level of abstraction.
Second, the TCC subsystem exposes its prompt in a protected space that no program can see; that means that programs silently fail and the agents don’t know why; what I have to do is remember that there is probably a permissions prompt on screen, log into the Mac Mini with screen-sharing software, and click OK.
Apple’d get a long way by just renaming the privilege. How many laypeople understand what a “disk” even is? Regular people just talk vaguely about how much “memory” their computer has - if they think about it at all other than when they run out of disk space - at which point, how many just think that means they have to buy a new computer? So, how about just “Full Access to All Your Data”? Call it what it basically is.
If Apple has time (or is especially motivated), it might also add more granular options to control what data apps can access. For example, instead of today’s single toggle that grants an app access to the broadly defined “data like Mail, Messages, Safari, Home, Time Machine backups, and certain administrative settings,” it might instead allow you to enable access to specific data on a per-app basis. This would allow, for example, Muse to access Mail and Safari, but not Messages or Time Machine.
With all the levels of entitlements and crap they added, I find it ironic that SIP is “only” implemented as “open up every damned thing to everyone” without more refined levels.
John:
I was frankly surprised when I learned FDA was for a machine, across user accounts, rather than for a single user. It seems like granting root, something the *nix community has tried to reduce and lock down for decades.
I certainly don’t trust anyone’s AI with root, and creating a weak, non-admin, user for AI experiments should be a safe path.
While [Gruber sees] this as a “why we can’t have nice things” moment, I see it as another case of Apple using privacy to limit competition in areas it currently lag behind.
I’d prefer to decouple trust in how my personal data is handled from trust in a particular platform or software vendor. That’s what I personally value about EU’s approach: give people rights over their information, make mishandling it a legal liability, and severely punish companies that break those rules.
Apple getting unique privileges to access sensitive data simply because they own the platform, and thus there is an implicit trust in their handling of it, feels like a brittle long-term strategy. If this works without causing anti-trust issues, it only makes Apple more dominant while locking out potentially useful software.
Previously:
- I Said No and Apple Said Yes
- Locked Down Passkey and Keychain Backups
- Meta AI for Mac and Muse
- Mandatory Apple Intelligence
- Reporting a Full Disk Access Bug to Apple
- Terminal and Full Disk Access
- macOS 11.4 Breaks Full Disk Access for Helper Tools
- The Alert Hammer
- Mojave’s New Security and Privacy Protections Face Usability Challenges
Update (2026-10-06): See also: TidBITS Talk and Vitor.
Whether or not you would ever want to unleash AI agents on your Mac, Apple does need to refine Full Disk Access as a matter of urgency. But its design and engineering cannot be rushed. Merely adding to the complexity of current Privacy settings wouldn’t help users, many of whom already find privacy protection confusing and opaque.
it’s clear there’s consumer demand for automated access to iMessages, and instead of offering a proper API with audit trails and fine-grained controls Apple would rather force users to FDA then cry fowl when they grant FDA.
Previously:
Update (2026-10-14): Adam Engst:
63% of the more than 200 people who voted said they had granted Full Disk Access to 6 or more apps, with over half of those people saying they had given 11 or more apps that level of access. In short, Full Disk Access is essential to how many of us use our Macs.
At the same time, Full Disk Access feels a bit like a Band-Aid, partly because Apple hasn’t put enough thought into more granular permissions, forcing many apps to rely on Full Disk Access even when they don’t need all its capabilities.
[…]
Given that Apple’s statement about Full Disk Access seems to have been prompted by the release of Meta’s Muse AI agent, I would suggest Apple think more carefully about how such agents should be handled. They may legitimately need Full Disk Access, along with numerous other permissions, but beyond what would appear in an App Privacy Report, I would like to see them maintain complete logs of every permission-enabled action they take on your computer. Preferably in human-readable form.
Update (2026-11-17): Alexandra Grot:
Full Disk Access has been part of our [Path Finder] development experience since Apple introduced the permission in macOS Mojave. And while we understand why it exists, we’ve also spent years dealing with its limitations.
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Our hope is that Apple will make it easier for users to control which files applications can access, while giving developers a more reliable way to determine what they’re allowed to do. Better protection for users and fewer permission-related problems for legitimate applications should go hand in hand.
Starting as soon as macOS 27.3, apps that request files outside of the permission scope will no longer get logged, and as a result, won’t show up as an option for quickly toggling Full Disk Access, per leaker pdfu.
This sounds like just security through obscurity, a return to the original Mojave user interface.
Previously:
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Wait, Full Disk Access allows access to all the data on a single machine, across user accounts, ignoring permissions on those folders and files? That is somewhat surprising, if true. I thought it would allow programmatic access to those files through various APIs and frameworks, but whether you could actually access their contents was still gated by permissions on the files/folders themselves.
@Simone I think it is still gated by those permissions. It’s probably not surprising that if I give a backup app FDA and enter my admin password it can back up the whole drive, including other user accounts. Apple’s FDA System Settings text says “for all users on this Mac.” But maybe it is surprising that combining that with giving Muse admin access to your account would let it access iMessages for other users, even though they didn’t grant anything. Hopefully, people aren’t giving it admin access at all.
I would add a 7th entry to the list: Apple totally fucked it up the last time they played with Full Disk Access changes.
It's no surprise that there are concerns. These days, nobody is expecting anything good from Apple when it comes to UI, UX and APIs.
> I think there is a good argument for protecting Full Disk Access further, but there’s also only so much you can do to protect a user from themselves.
I'm incredibly confused by all of this. Protect FDA further? How? There is no API developers can use to get Full Disk Access. Nobody gets FDA from an entitlement? All you can do is ask the user to give full disk access in your own custom UI. So users at their own discretion can give ANY app full disk access. One of my apps, the UX would be smoother if the user granted FDA in certain situations. But I don't even bother asking for it. I don't want to deal with that but I certainly could understand why an "advanced user" would go ahead and grant FDA on their own.
So...how do you lock something down that is already pretty much locked down..other than getting rid of it entirely? Like there is no getting around malware throwing up NSOpenPanel and directing users to pick a folder. Or malware throwing up an alert trying to get you to type your password. My guess is they are just going to whitelist some of their favorites and take away the user's control.
@Simone,
No need to worry. It isn't true. File and directory permissions are still respected. Full Disk Access only bypasses TCC permissions. Full Disk Access is most useful for accessing a user's own documents, bypassing one or more popup dialogs (or the new default deny setting in macOS 27). There are also some system edge cases which seem to serve no purpose other than detecting if Full Disk Access is enabled.
There's also no need to worry about backup apps. Those apps already need special entitlements for APFS snapshots. So there's an established mechanism for backup apps and known developer history.
But people worried about the screen recording permissions are on the right path. It seems logical that Apple will use that as a template. But since Full Disk Access is often used for command line tools, Apple might also employ the same mechanism used for local network access. With this design, apps that aren't built properly may lose their Full Disk Access when updated.
Currently, Full Disk Access is something restricted to the user. Apps can't get it themselves. There isn't even an official way to check for it. But developers don't actually need to do any special coding, or request any entitlements, for it either. That's likely to change. And Full Disk Access can be freely granted to Mac App Store apps. That's almost certain to change.
And finally, it's important to note that Full Disk Access hasn't been for a long time. It's not root, so it can't access root-only data or other user data. And without Full Disk Access, root can't access TCC-protected user data. Full Disk Access doesn't help with Apple Data Vaults. Apple is now using those more extensively, for tens of GBs of data, blocking all access unless using Recovery or disabling SIP.
Full Disk Access is mostly a remanent of Apple going half in on sandboxing and then backing out. macOS should specify what apps have access to with enough granularity that much fewer apps need to ask for full disk access. Aside from disk usage scanners and backup software, most apps need far less.
I'm all for more granularity in access levels and more resistance before "all data, any time."
People should just run their Mac’s with SIP and AMFI off. Then all these nonsense restrictions just go away. We lived for decades without SIP, and we can continue living without it.
Ever since the advent of sandboxing on the Mac, I've felt like Apple's stance has left out the notion that the user should be an active participant. The whole system seems predicated on the approach that Apple must protect the users from 3rd party developers, rather than that Apple should provide developers and users tools to negotiate this together.
The only view that is provided is a capability-centric view which just shows a list of apps with no affordance for the developer to explain how the permission is used. I think we need to be able to view by capability, yes, but also by app and each view should provide the developer with a place to explain what the capability is for and whether it is optional or required for the app to function.
As it is, there is no easy way for me to look at an app, see all the capabilities it has, and see the developer's explanation of how they are used.
Every file search program, including my own Find Any File, also need FDA - I hope Apple keeps that in mind.
Also, I think it would already help a lot if there were distinct read vs. write permissions for FDA - most apps only need read-only FDA, and the user should at least be able to designate that separately from FDA write access, as that a read-only FDA would be sufficient for backup and file search tools, already.
Lastly, I've been working last winter and spring on a new tool that would do for the file system what Little Snitch does for the network: Allow you to monitor and optionally control which apps(!) access which folders. I.e. something more fine-grained than Apple's FDA. But after I tried twice to get the required entitlement from Apple for this and getting rejected every time, I've given up.
They sound antsy (“Addressing this is critical.”). I wonder if they'll restrict it in 27.4 and fuck over the early Golden Gate enthusiasts.
@Thomas Yes, a read-only option would be great. Contra Apple, I’m less concerned with apps reading stuff (because I limit outflows via Little Snitch) and more concerned with them deleting/breaking things.
The problem is, there's granularity for certain folders—an app can request access to Photos and that comes up as its own permission request—but outside of that set of folders, the only option is FDA, which really means "everything else." It's effectively a catch-all.
It would be better if Apple built an API for requesting access that let programs define exactly which parts of the filesystem they need to access, so that the user could be prompted to allow access to just those paths. This wouldn't need to be granular to individual files, but at least to directories and optionally their children. Ideally, there'd be a file provided by Apple that would translate various paths into plain-language purposes, so the user could see that an app needs access to, say, "your Bambu Studio settings" instead of the path to that folder. (But the actual requested paths ought to be available to power users somehow.)
As a UNIX admin it feels a lot like the days before file ACLs became a thing; trying to manage permissions when your only choices were "owner, group, or everybody" were a lot more difficult to constrain.
> It would be better if Apple built an API for requesting access that let programs define exactly which parts of the filesystem they need to access, so that the user could be prompted to allow access to just those paths.
NSOpenPanel, the System provided chooser already does this for the most part. Certain files/folders have extra protection though and won't work with it or will throw up additional alerts which breaks an automated workflow. So these prompts make security worse in practice because users just grant FDA instead.
It’ll probably be similar to Apple Photos on iOS where you can have different levels of access, including “you manually add what you’re willing to share”. Or perhaps the personal info intermediary that Apple proposed for the Siri AI in the EU, but with a lock-down until that’s complete.
It’s a bit of a pain but security is a pain, and boy, you probably don’t want AI to run rampant on your personal computer.
We already went through this decades ago with ‘allow Facebook to access your contacts’ allowing them to create a giant network of our personal relationships which haunt us to today.
The blame here doesn’t lie with Apple — blame the AI companies and scammers instead — but Apple’s the ones saddled with having to solve it for our (user) benefit/protection.
> How many laypeople understand what a “disk” even is?
Maybe you should have to watch a 10 minute video and take a very simple quiz before you can use the Mac. I don't even care anymore; if they fail the quiz after 3 tries, it gives them instructions on how to obtain a full refund.
Maybe throw something in there too on how to identify phishing scams.
>The blame here doesn’t lie with Apple
Apple deserves part of the blame. If you create a system where the only way to grant access to one particular piece of data is to grant access to the entire disk, that's on you.
Suggestions about making changes to Full Disk Access are essentially feature requests for something else. If you limit what an app can read under Full Disk Access can you still call it Full Disk Access?
Programs used to have full access of the disk on Macs back in the 80s and 90s.
Why was that changed? Why do we even have to give permission for full-disk access? Could there possibly be a reason that was necessary?
Facebook has now brought light to:
* SystemUptime abuse
* NSUserDefaults abuse
* Full Disk Access abuse
Good Guy Facebook is more proactive about getting Apple to address longtime privacy issues than Apple ever is. /s
(My other argument was: Apple only locks something down when a developer uses it in a novel way.)
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Any bets on Apple's response? New magic entitlements for select devs (so they can reject legit long-time devs a few times a year, per usual)? New Info.plist entries for everyone? A 10-step process for users to turn it on for 1 app with scary warnings? Notifications bugging users to turn it off breaking legitimate apps? All the above?
Then macOS 28: Alcatraz can make Sandboxed apps mandatory because this will be the year AI becomes scary. Then WWDC 27 can introduce a $500/year "Trusted Developer" program that gives devs the option of asking a user to run one app outside the sandbox.
@Somoene else “ Why was that changed? Why do we even have to give permission for full-disk access? Could there possibly be a reason that was necessary?”
Apart from the fact that for multiple decades, the number one security issue has been more about private data being collected and exfiltrated from a personal computer than the OS getting corrupted, nothing.
"Maybe you should have to watch a 10 minute video and take a very simple quiz before you can use the Mac"
Macs used to come with a little intro program that taught users the basics:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ovjYxIK_48Y
I don't see a reason why Apple can't bring that back, although good luck to them trying to explain the complexities of modern OS X.
I'm basically with Léo here and just run with SIP off (and maybe I should add AMFI too, given all the stuff it disallows, but also given how many privilege boundaries it controls, it might not be advisable, at least not on a travelling notebook). Life's too short to deal with Apple's paternalistic nonsense. They really need to appreciate that some users would simply rather not have guardrails that they can't control for themselves.
Which raises the broader question, really: what's the App Store for? Is it about the sandbox, in which case app review is a scam and a civic alternative would be superior, or is it about app review, in which case Apple should be making all these difficult decisions for the user? Bolting on full disk access with a proper TCC gate that can be triggered under the app's control which allows the user to understand the permission being granted and the reason for it, and/or providing sufficient granularity to app devs so they can actually empower users with highly specific filesystem access permissions never seems to have occurred to them, so I have to assume this was just hole-filling to push liability toward the user at essentially no cost to themselves, and now they're paying the price in overbroad, but legitimate, permissions requirements for AI agents (and all the bad press that goes with it).