iPhone Thieves Locking Users Out of Their Apple Accounts
Nicole Nguyen and Joanna Stern (MacRumors, Hacker News):
Greg Frasca has been locked out of his Apple account since October, and he’ll do just about anything to get back in.
He has offered to fly from Florida to Apple’s California headquarters to prove his identity in person, or write a check for $10,000 to reclaim the account. It holds the only copies of eight years of photos of his young daughters.
This is all because the thieves who stole Mr. Frasca’s iPhone 14 Pro at a bar in Chicago wanted to drain cash from his bank account and prevent him from remotely tracking down the stolen phone. They used his passcode to change the 46-year-old’s Apple ID password. They also enabled a hard-to-find Apple security setting known as the “recovery key.” In doing so, they placed an impenetrable lock on his account.
But this is not because Apple can’t restore access. It’s just their policy not to support other forms of recovery identification: driver’s license, backup e-mail, postal mail, physically appearing at an Apple Store, etc. The article cites an example where Apple did restore an account after the customer answered some verification questions, but this option does not seem to be available to most.
The article recommends enabling Screen Time protections, which may help against an unsophisticated thief, but as discussed before this seems to not be a true solution.
It’s better to have a backup of your photos, though I’m not sure there’s an automated way to do that if you don’t have a Mac.
IMHO, the crazy part is that it is possible to create a new Recovery Key with just the iPhone passcode (and the iPhone). So basically, the iPhone passcode is mightier than the Recovery Key. The only purpose of the Recovery Key is to protect against SIM swapping attacks. I didn’t know this.
So an attacker with the iPhone passcode can lock you out of your Apple account on all devices, even if they don’t have your Apple ID password or your Recovery Key.
Previously:
- Apple Card Savings Account Launches
- Photos Data Loss With macOS 13.3 Beta
- Changing Apple ID Password Using Only a Device and Passcode
- Apple Accounts “Permanently” Blocked
- Password Reset iCloud Account Vulnerability
- Locked Out of an Apple Account
Update (2023-04-21): Adam Engst:
Although I haven’t been able to find a detailed explanation of how the recovery key works in Apple’s Platform Security Guide, my understanding is that it essentially acts as a second copy of a user-managed encryption key that takes over from Apple’s usual account recovery option.
[…]
When the Wall Street Journal article talks about how victims attempt to prove ownership of their accounts with various forms of identification, it’s missing the point—identification is not in question; the data is simply inaccessible because it’s encrypted with a key that Apple doesn’t control.
I’m not sure that’s the case. If it were, then what was the point of Advanced Data Protection? Anyway, I think Apple needs to document this better.
The best protection right now is to use Screen Time, as I discussed in my previous article.
[…]
Unfortunately, it does that by preventing you from even entering Settings > Your Name without first going to Settings > Screen Time > Content & Privacy Restrictions > Account Changes > Screen Time Passcode > Allow, and then setting it back to Don’t Allow once you’re done. If Apple tweaked iOS 17 to prompt for the Screen Time passcode when accessing the blocked options, it would be much easier to recommend.
It used to be you could do a certain set of actions that would allow you to change the password even with the screen time passcode block (I won’t list them.) But with 16.4 Apple now requires you to confirm a trusted phone number, and then requires you to use another trusted device to actually change the password.
See also: Bruce Schneier.
Previously:
Update (2023-05-01): Doug Miller:
I have both a recovery key set and a screen time passcode and I can still go through and change the Apple ID password with the procedure you listed.
[…]
Having a screen time passcode with account changes disallowed makes it harder to find the Apple ID address on the device, but not impossible.