Archive for August 14, 2026

Friday, August 14, 2026

TabControl Scam and the App Review Queue

Jeff Johnson:

Despite my history of uncovering App Store frauds, I rarely go looking for these things intentionally! They’re just so pervasive and obvious, they jump out at me. In this case, I was looking at the list of top paid Safari extensions in the Mac App Store, because two of my own extensions are currently on the list, when I noticed the TabControl Extension.

[…]

The Mac App Store “screenshot” for the app is not actually a screenshot at all. If you look closely, that’s not the real Safari: the toolbar elements are wrong. I suspect that the image was AI-generated.

[…]

Another thing you should note in the fake screenshot is the “4.9 out of 5” stars, giving the impression that this is the App Store user rating of the app.

[…]

These purported reviews, all but one of which is 5 stars, are all in English. Yet none of them is in the US App Store. […] If you’ve ever looked through App Store user reviews, it’s unusual to find this naming format. […] the dates on the reviews, such as “Mar 12,” predate the release of TabControl Extension in the App Store!

John Gruber:

God only knows what this obvious AI slop scam is doing with the data from users’ Safari tabs. It’s currently the 12th or 13th most popular Safari extension in the App Store.

Jeff Johnson:

Coincidentally, on the same day well-known developer Marco Arment complained on social media that his new, unreleased Mac App Store app had been waiting 12 days for review by Apple.

Arment ended up waiting on hold—listening to an odd choice of music—to talk to App Review, which I didn’t realize was an option. His Unforgetful app is now approved.

Johnson continued browsing Safari extensions in the store:

The apps’s privacy policy is again on Google Drive, but the developer website link goes to https://aee5e5015.app-ads-txt.com, a suspicious URL. This website is barren and simply redirects back to the App Store[…] Did App Store review ever bother to click the developer website link?

[…]

In addition to the 41 apps, each of which required at least one submission to App Store review, I count across those 41 apps at least 327 updates, almost all of which have the same generic description for what’s new in the update: "Bug fixes and performance improvements." So that’s at least 368 submissions to App Store review, most within the past 12 months, from a single developer. In other words, the developer is averaging almost one submission per day. We can count only approved submissions; we have no idea how many submissions by the developer were privately rejected by App Store review.

I get the impression that Apple is asleep at the wheel. Is anyone at Apple counting submissions per developer? How many is too many? How many resources is one developer allowed to consume?

[…]

You may view it as a noble, democratic ideal to treat every app developer the same, but in reality this is the path to the crApp Store, full of scams and slop.

John Voorhees:

There’s no doubt that there is spam on the App Store, but the way to remove it is to target the spammers, not new developers, students, and hobbyists looking to build their ideas. I know that being an indie developer isn’t an easy way to make a living, but erecting barriers to submitting apps is the surest way to starve Apple platforms of fresh, innovative ideas.

John Voorhees:

I’d like to see App Store spam cleaned up as much as anyone, but the way to do it isn’t preferring well-known developers and those who can afford to pay more for special treatment.

Marc Palmer:

I don’t agree with paid tiers either. However it feels like there should be a natural brake applied to new developers and new apps. It’s no big deal if your first app takes a week or two to review (often did 10y ago), and as it matures & receives meaningful updates in the store, turnaround increases as trust and “value” (active users?) builds up. Like “tarpitting” new accounts. I think limiting the # of new apps you can add per month to say 1 or 2 would also help…

Jeff Johnson:

I was a new App Store developer myself ten years ago. My previous article didn’t propose any new barriers for those groups. To be clear, I did imply that no developer, whether new or not, should have more than 40 apps and average a new App Store submission every day of the year. I’m not aware of any prominent developer who has that many. Apparently, checking just now, Microsoft by my count has 38 App Store apps between iOS and Mac, which is a lot but still less than the 41 apps of the developer I discussed in my previous article who is definitely not one of the largest software developers in the world along with Microsoft. I do think it’s reasonable for Microsoft to pay a significantly higher developer fee to have those 38 apps reviewed than a smaller developer pays to have one app reviewed by Apple.

[…]

My contention is that Apple is actually wasting its own resources treating every developer like a potential spammer or scammer, even the developers who are known to be trustworthy, and this wasting of resources makes it harder on everyone, including new developers, students, and hobbyists. App review is grossly inefficient, and it’s clearly failing to scale to the increase in App Store submissions. What I propose is not raising the gates but rather lowering the gates for developers who have already proven trustworthy, so that Apple can focus its review efforts where they’re most needed.

I’m not sure that paying more would help anything. If scams are profitable, surely it would be worth them paying more, and then we’re back to square one. And I don’t want to create another situation like App Store Search Ads where providing poor service makes the revenue numbers go up. But I like the general idea of considering the account’s history, e.g. the way the Discourse forum gradually increases trust over time. It should count for something if you have a long history of following the rules and submitting updates to a small number of apps on a reasonable schedule vs. frequent spamming of submissions that don’t even have real release notes. It would not be fair for Microsoft to be able to cut in line, but giving spammers equal access to the review queue means they’ll use more than their share of Apple’s resources. That also seems unfair. The current system encourages frequent submissions, which also increases the overall load on the reviewers. I think the incentives need to be changed somehow. Maybe each account should get a certain number of “fast” submissions per month or year, after which you can still submit but it goes into a lower priority queue.

William Gallagher:

Even among more legitimate-seeming apps, though, Apple is ignoring clear problems. In AppleInsider research, for instance, we found that many price tiers listed for the “Simply Piano” app bore no relation to what the developer actually charges.

[…]

You shouldn’t have to be the one to investigate apps you want to try. That is the future of third-party App Stores, and that is a future to be fought.

But that future is here with the first-party App Store we already have. And this inability to trust an App Store is here, right now, because Apple will not do what it keeps saying it is doing and what it is charging developers to do.

Previously:

SQLite WAL-Reset Bug

Alex Chan (Hacker News):

Many of these outages were caused by a single bug, deep in SQLite. It took months of intense forensics to track it down.

[…]

This lack of reliable trigger conditions meant we couldn’t reproduce the bug synthetically. Instead, we had to rely on deploying passive, forensic telemetry in our live environment to catch the corruption red-handed. Gathering live diagnostics for a database issue is the last thing we wanted to do, but we had no choice.

[…]

As an additional complication, the corruption didn’t occur on a regular schedule. Sometimes incidents would be hours apart, other times weeks. This made it difficult to predict progress or plan further work, because we were never sure when we’d get our next diagnostic dump. We had a six-week period between October and December when there were no corruption incidents, before they returned as an unwelcome Christmas present.

[…]

In two incidents, our transaction logs failed to replay cleanly. Upon closer inspection, we discovered that data written and committed by one transaction was inexplicably invisible to later transactions. A write had vanished into thin air without raising an error.

SQLite:

The bug is likely present in all version of SQLite from 3.7.0 (2010-07-21) through 3.51.2 (2026-01-09). It is fixed in version 3.51.3 (2026-03-13) and later. Backports of the fix are available for some earlier releases: 3.44.6 and 3.50.7.

The bug only affects databases in WAL mode when there are two or more database connections open on the same file, in separate threads or processes, and when those two connections attempt to write or checkpoint at the same instant.

Alex Chan:

This investigation is a useful reminder: running boring technology in a non-standard way is a risk. The common paths and standard configurations are incredibly well-tested and reliable. Most people use SQLite in a standard configuration and never face this sort of issue. Everything we were doing was a public, documented, supported configuration—but by taking manual control of the checkpointing process and running at our own aggressive pace, we stepped off the well-trodden operational path.

Scott Perry:

I spent the last two years of my time working on SQLite trying to chase this bug down. It was so rare that I never got an internal report; my assessment of the number of customers affected was “about a county’s worth”, some of whom were generous enough to allow their local Genius Bar to send me backups of the affected databases. I spent so many hours in a hex editor staring at the wreckage.

Top three data corruption bug of my career for sure, and the other two weren’t bugs in SQLite.

A former Tailscale employee got in touch and shared that they were checkpointing these databases every 250ms. Multiplied across a fleet of servers that is a fantastic way to surface a super rare bug—they basically built our test rack as a product, but two orders of magnitude more effective (partially due to scale, but mostly because our rack also panics devices at random in order to test the filesystem, NAND controller, etc. and rebooting takes a while)

[…]

13/10 fantastic bug. proof that 100% test coverage is a good start, and that formal methods are needed for critical applications.

Carl Sverre (Hacker News):

I whipped out my phone, and asked Claude to get to work. I had it get SQL 3.51.2 – still buggy – set up in Antithesis, and then instrument the code with a bunch of Antithesis assertions. You can see the instrumented version here.

Then I asked it to write a simple workload which exercised the WAL insert and checkpoint code. Notably, this is a completely generic workload. It just runs writes and checkpoints concurrently – things you’d expect to actually happen in production, all the time. The assertions are also generic to the bug, they’re all standard assertions you’d add to any database, things like “no lost committed writes” and “database is not corrupt” (called integrity check in sqlite).

On my first run, Antithesis caught the bug in 15 mins. Here’s the report.

Of course, it helps that he knew to look in the checkpoint code, but you could imagine using tools like this to quickly investigate hypotheses when you don’t already know the answer.

Copyright © 2000–2026 Michael Tsai.