Lockdown Mode
Apple (MacRumors, Hacker News):
Apple today detailed two initiatives to help protect users who may be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats, such as those from private companies developing state-sponsored mercenary spyware. Lockdown Mode — the first major capability of its kind, coming this fall with iOS 16, iPadOS 16, and macOS Ventura — is an extreme, optional protection for the very small number of users who face grave, targeted threats to their digital security.
[…]
Messages: Most message attachment types other than images are blocked. Some features, like link previews, are disabled.
Web browsing: Certain complex web technologies, like just-in-time (JIT) JavaScript compilation, are disabled unless the user excludes a trusted site from Lockdown Mode.
Apple services: Incoming invitations and service requests, including FaceTime calls, are blocked if the user has not previously sent the initiator a call or request.
And no configuration profiles. This sounds great, though I would rather see something like Little Snitch for iOS to help protect against rogue apps.
See also: Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Ron Deibert.
Previously:
- iOS 15.2 and iPadOS 15.2
- Apple Sues NSO Group
- Record App Activity
- Zero-click iMessage Attacks
- Scanning Your iPhone for Pegasus
- Through the Blast Door
- Data Privacy Day at Apple
Update (2026-03-19): Saagar Jha (tweet):
Lockdown Mode is so poorly implemented that I would be shocked if more than a handful of people at Apple had it turned on. I think everyone I know who is using it is explicitly running an insecure configuration to work around it being so bad. What a waste of a good idea.
I have little confidence in its ability to prevent harm in the real world. Apple cannot explain to you what it does or what it changes about your phone. Users have no insight into what it blocks or why. Its implementation is wildly inconsistent across platforms.
Those who have it enabled invariably seem to barely use Apple services at all; they are instead on Signal/WhatsApp/etc. which is basically unaffected by Lockdown Mode. Which makes sense because it takes exactly one FaceTime call from your mom being blocked before you turn it off.
Previously:
1 Comment RSS · Twitter
Agreed, this is more implicit trust in Apple; what's wanted is user audits and controls over traffic. Also, it's a shame you can't enable features independently: I can see a use for disabling link previews and attachment types, but not restricting communication from outsiders. Let's hope this all amounts to someding useful.
