Thursday, October 29, 2026

eMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise

Dan Goodin:

Security personnel around the world are on high alert Tuesday following the discovery of eight TLS certificates with private keys so weak they could allow anyone to mint trusted browser and app credentials for any site on the Internet.

As of late morning Tuesday, browser makers and some major apps and programming languages had blocked all eight of the intermediate certificates.

[…]

“This will be a massive cleanup job, bigger than Heartbleed,” Filippo Valsorda, a cryptography engineer and a cryptography maintainer for the open source Go programming language, told Ars. “There will be a very, very long tail, IoT devices, Docker containers, forgotten Linux machines, unmaintained CLI tools that shipped their own copy of the roots (which is common in some ecosystems, like Python). Also, Linux distributions are still rolling out updates, some of them are not ready yet, and then system administrators will need to apply them to a lot of machines.”

[…]

The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that’s challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.

[…]

Ben Cartwright-Cox, director of BGP.tools, said: “My guess is that it’s example code that accidentally leaked to production, but hard to know. But it’s bonkers that no one noticed.”

Apple (Hacker News):

On 19 October 2026, Apple began blocking these 12 certificates on Apple devices. Updates to certificate configuration data are sent to devices automatically and as needed, so you don’t need to install a software update to get this change. Apple is making additional updates to this block, which will also be delivered automatically. On 23 October 2026, Apple also began blocking the emSign ECC Root CA - G3.

[…]

On Mac, some command-line tools included with macOS or the Xcode Command Line Tools (including curl, git, python3, ruby, perl, and openssl) check certificates against /etc/ssl/cert.pem. For certificates that chain to a root CA certificate in this file, these tools don’t check Apple’s block or whether the certificate has been revoked. This file will be updated in a future macOS update. If you use these tools and don’t want to wait for the update, you can remove root CA certificates from the file.

[…]

These steps affect every tool that uses /etc/ssl/cert.pem. Afterward, tools that use only this file might not be able to verify some websites whose certificates chain to these root CA certificates through intermediate CAs that weren’t affected.

emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com (Hacker News):

Apple has warned that until it ships its own fix, a macOS update may replace /etc/ssl/cert.pem. You may need to repeat these steps after each update.

See also: Filippo Valsorda, Howard Oakley, and TidBITS-Talk.

Previously:

Update (2026-11-02): Howard Oakley:

Apps written using standard Apple APIs, including many of mine, use the macOS trust store, which Apple updated between 19-23 October to block eMudhra’s compromised certificates. Those updates don’t appear in any common sources of information like System Settings, SilentKnight or even SystHist, though. If you want to confirm that your Mac or device has been updated, the best test is to view the checks Dennis Jackson generously provides, using Safari or another app that you know uses the macOS APIs.

[…]

Problems get worse once you look beyond macOS itself. Among the many apps that maintain their own trust stores, rather than using either of the above, are Google Chrome, Chromium-based browsers, Mozilla and Microsoft products, and some Electron apps. For those you’ll need to update that app to a version whose trust store has been updated to block the compromised certificates. But how can you tell whether that’s required for an app other than a browser? Others could also be affected if they use a language like Python, Java, Go, or possibly Rust or Ruby. Compiling a list of all Mac apps that might need their internal trust stores updated is a daunting task, and unlikely to happen.

If you were using the internet back in 2014, you may recall the chaos that resulted from Heartbleed, a severe vulnerability in OpenSSL 1.0.1, a precursor of TLS, leading to mass compromise of certificates and over a year of global insecurity. While eMudhra’s compromised certificates aren’t on the same scale, they demonstrate how little we learned from that.

Update (2026-11-10): Apple:

Starting in macOS 27.2.1, these command-line tools stop accepting these certificates. For Mac computers that use macOS 26 or macOS 15, macOS 26.7.3 and macOS 15.8.3 also include this protection.

Previously:

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I’m very surprised that Apple won’t release an urgent .1 patch release (or even a RSR or whatever that’s called now) to fix the certificate store for CLI apps.


PKIX WORKS!!!!!

And I especially like the way they re-expose you after you install the update. They clearly care enough to modify what is supposed to be a user configuration file under /etc, but somehow they can't design a security update mechanism to do that, or to synchronise that particular file with the installed roots? So rather than just making this a purely user responsibility, they just publish an article telling developers they and their time don't matter and would they just work around Apple's inattention to security? FFS. If it's not already clear, definitely consider installing even the most essential tools from Brew or MacPorts, because Apple don't seem bothered by the state of their UNIX underpinnings.


On one hand, Apple loves to keep their cadence to "surprise and delight" their users. However, this often means that minor updates are always attached to their .x updates. For example: the Apple Music app redesign.

It just sucks that even critical software and security updates have to be shoehorned into said .x updates instead of being shipped critically; especially in a world where most Linux distros and OSS projects running entirely with volunteer developers have pushed the patches already. Apple is clearly capable of great security work, but often drop the ball hard when something happens outside their release cadence.


eMudhra’s compromised certificates are not on the same scale as the OpenSSL vulnerability? I beg to differ.

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