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	<title>Comments on: Cold Boot Attacks on Disk Encryption</title>
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	<link>http://mjtsai.com/blog/2008/02/21/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/</link>
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	<pubDate>Sat, 22 Nov 2008 00:13:28 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Michael</title>
		<link>http://mjtsai.com/blog/2008/02/21/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-243497</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 01:16:44 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I was thinking of the shutdown case. I agree that the screensaver case is probably hopeless, unless it also unmounts the volume.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was thinking of the shutdown case. I agree that the screensaver case is probably hopeless, unless it also unmounts the volume.</p>
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		<title>By: Drew Thaler</title>
		<link>http://mjtsai.com/blog/2008/02/21/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-243484</link>
		<dc:creator>Drew Thaler</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 00:41:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mjtsai.com/blog/2008/02/21/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-243484</guid>
		<description>Erasing the key in memory isn't necessarily useful. It helps, of course, but with whole-disk encryption the key has to be in memory whenever the disk is mounted. Even if there's some other obstacle blocking the bad guys who've nabbed your computer (a password-protected screensaver, etc) this method would allow them to circumvent it by just extracting the key from RAM.

It might help to create a RAM with a hardware scrubber which forcibly wipes the state if the RAM loses power. But things like &lt;a href="http://www.wiebetech.com/products/HotPlug.php"&gt;WiebeTech's HotPlug&lt;/a&gt; make me even wonder how long that would be useful. 

I guess physical security is still your best bet in the end.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Erasing the key in memory isn't necessarily useful. It helps, of course, but with whole-disk encryption the key has to be in memory whenever the disk is mounted. Even if there's some other obstacle blocking the bad guys who've nabbed your computer (a password-protected screensaver, etc) this method would allow them to circumvent it by just extracting the key from RAM.</p>
<p>It might help to create a RAM with a hardware scrubber which forcibly wipes the state if the RAM loses power. But things like <a href="http://www.wiebetech.com/products/HotPlug.php">WiebeTech's HotPlug</a> make me even wonder how long that would be useful. </p>
<p>I guess physical security is still your best bet in the end.</p>
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